The Supreme Court Just Heard Arguments on Birthright Citizenship. Here Is What the 14th Amendment Actually Says.

For many Muslim immigrant families, the Supreme Court fight over birthright citizenship is not abstract law. It is about whether a child born in the United States starts life with clear legal status, or with uncertainty built in from day one. That is why the Court's April 1 oral arguments matter so much. The case could reshape how the government treats the children of undocumented immigrants and of parents on temporary visas, including student, work, and visitor visas.

The immediate legal fight comes from President Donald Trump's January 2025 executive order, which seeks to deny automatic citizenship to some children born in the United States if their parents are not citizens or lawful permanent residents. During oral argument on April 1, several justices, including conservative members of the Court, signaled skepticism about the administration's position. Reuters reported that the justices appeared doubtful about the legality of the order, and SCOTUSblog's oral argument review described broad questioning across the bench.

The starting point is the Constitution itself. Section 1 of the 14th Amendment says: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” That sentence does a lot of work. It answers the basic question of who becomes a citizen at birth. It does not say that a child’s citizenship depends on the parents’ immigration category. It focuses first on birth in the United States and on being subject to U.S. jurisdiction.

That language was added after the Civil War, in part to overturn Dred Scott and make national citizenship clear and secure. Over time, courts treated the citizenship clause as a broad rule, not a narrow political favor. The most important precedent is United States v. Wong Kim Ark, the 1898 Supreme Court case holding that a man born in San Francisco to Chinese parents was a U.S. citizen by birth. That case has long stood for the rule that birth on U.S. soil generally means citizenship, with only limited exceptions such as children of foreign diplomats.

The administration's argument is that the phrase “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” is narrower than the traditional reading. In broad terms, the government argues that some children born in the United States should not qualify if their parents lack the right kind of lasting legal tie to the country. Critics say that reading collides with the text, with the history of the amendment, and with more than a century of settled law. They also say an executive order cannot override a constitutional guarantee that courts and governments have long recognized.

This is where the case has immediate community relevance. Muslim families in the United States include citizens, green card holders, visa holders, refugees, asylum seekers, and undocumented people. A rule that narrows birthright citizenship would not land on some abstract group. It would hit actual families in actual maternity wards, schools, and neighborhoods. It would also raise basic questions about passports, Social Security numbers, health coverage, school enrollment, and protection from future removal.

The argument in favor of the order is mostly framed around immigration control. Supporters say birthright citizenship creates incentives for illegal immigration and has been read too broadly for too long. The argument against the order is more direct: the Constitution already answered this question, and the government cannot rewrite that answer by executive action. On that point, the questioning at oral argument mattered. Justices pressed the administration on text, history, and precedent, especially the force of Wong Kim Ark.

A final decision is expected before the Supreme Court’s term ends, likely by late June. When that ruling comes down, the headline will matter, but so will the reasoning. If the Court rejects the order, it will likely reaffirm what the citizenship clause means and why precedent still controls. If it narrows the rule, the consequences would reach far beyond one administration. For SMFNews readers, the real point is simple. Birthright citizenship is not a slogan. It is a constitutional rule with direct consequences for immigrant Muslim families, and the 14th Amendment’s text is still the place where the argument begins.

Sources

• National Archives: 14th Amendment text

• SCOTUSblog: Supreme Court appears likely to side against Trump on birthright citizenship

• Reuters: Supreme Court justices skeptical of Trump birthright citizenship order

• White House: Executive Order on birthright citizenship (January 20, 2025)

• National Archives: Wong Kim Ark case records

• Supreme Court: Trump v. Barbara oral argument audio and transcript

UK Parliament Hosts Baqi Commemoration, Renewing Calls for Access and Preservation

A high-level event at the House of Lords this week marked the 100-year anniversary of the destruction of the Baqi Cemetery, bringing the issue into a formal political setting and signaling a shift toward coordinated advocacy in the United Kingdom. The program, organized by the Al Baqee Organization in partnership with the Al Khoei Foundation, drew faith leaders, policymakers, and community representatives for a focused discussion on access, preservation, and accountability.

The event comes amid renewed global attention on religious heritage sites and their protection, with organizers positioning Baqi as part of a broader conversation on cultural and religious rights. Hosting the discussion inside Parliament moved the issue into a policy environment where engagement with decision-makers can take place directly.

Mohammed Al-Hilli addressed the audience and framed the issue in direct terms. Sheikh Mohammed Al-Hilli stated that “the need for women to be allowed entry into Baqi cannot be ignored” and emphasized that “the opportunity today to apply political pressure and lobby cannot be taken lightly.” His remarks tied the destruction of the cemetery to present-day restrictions, describing the issue as ongoing and unresolved.

The Al Baqee Organization has taken a structured approach focused on policy engagement alongside awareness efforts. Its work includes organizing international events, building interfaith partnerships, and engaging lawmakers. This event reflects that strategy and signals a move toward sustained advocacy within formal political channels.

The Baqi Cemetery in Medina, referred to by the same name as the organization, holds deep significance in Islamic history. It is the burial site of members of the family of the Prophet Muhammad and many early companions. In 1925, the cemetery was demolished during the formation of the Saudi state. Structures marking graves were removed, leaving the site largely unmarked. Efforts to rebuild or preserve the cemetery have not progressed, and access restrictions, including limitations affecting women, remain a point of concern.

Recent coverage and community reporting around the anniversary point to growing international coordination on the issue, particularly in Western countries where advocacy can intersect with political systems. The House of Lords event reflects that shift. It places Baqi within a broader discussion of religious rights and heritage preservation while signaling a continued push for political engagement.

SMFNews: What FISA Section 702 Is and Why Muslim Americans Should Pay Attention

Muslim Americans have strong reason to watch the fight over FISA Section 702, a federal surveillance authority that Congress temporarily extended through April 30, 2026. The law is aimed at foreigners abroad, but it can still pull in Americans’ calls, texts, and emails when they communicate with people overseas. That matters for Muslim families, students, business owners, journalists, and activists whose ordinary lives often cross borders.

The short term extension happened after both a longer clean extension and a longer reform bill failed in the House. As the Associated Press reported, Congress settled on a ten day stopgap and President Donald Trump signed it on April 18, keeping Section 702 alive only through the end of this month. The short deadline means the real argument is still ahead: how much surveillance power the government should keep, and what limits should apply when Americans’ communications are swept in.

Section 702 is part of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, usually called FISA. It lets the National Security Agency collect communications of non-Americans who are reasonably believed to be outside the United States for foreign intelligence purposes. The government does not need a traditional warrant for each target. Instead, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court approves general procedures for how the program operates.

That sounds narrow, but the actual reach is much wider. If an American is texting, emailing, or calling a foreign target, that American’s side of the conversation can be collected too. This is often called incidental collection. A recent staff report from the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) said Section 702 remains one of the country’s most valuable foreign intelligence tools, while also acknowledging that it has serious privacy and civil liberties implications and depends on safeguards, compliance rules, and oversight.

The main argument for Section 702 is speed. Supporters inside the intelligence community say the program helps the United States track foreign spies, terrorism threats, cyber operations, and kidnapping or assassination plots. The FBI says information acquired under Section 702 has helped it understand and disrupt foreign government plots. Supporters also say Congress tightened the rules in 2024 through the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act (RISAA), and that those reforms should be given time to work.

The main argument against Section 702 is that it still gives the government too much room to search through Americans’ communications without a warrant. Civil liberties critics point to a long record of improper searches and argue that a foreign intelligence tool should not become a back door into Americans’ private messages. That is the core political fight now. One side says new guardrails are enough. The other side says Americans’ data should not be searchable without a judge-signed warrant in the first place.

Why does this land differently in Muslim communities?

Because Muslim Americans have lived through the hard edge of national security law before. In Tanzin v. Tanvir, the Supreme Court allowed Muslim men to seek damages after they said FBI agents placed them on the No Fly List for refusing to act as informants against their religious communities. In FBI v. Fikre, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled in 2024 that a Muslim American could keep challenging his placement on the No Fly List after the government removed him from it.

Those were not Section 702 cases, but they show why broad surveillance powers and weak accountability create special fear in communities that have already seen mosque surveillance, informant pressure, and watchlist abuse.

The practical question is not only what Section 702 permits on paper. It is how it works once agencies start using it, how often Americans are caught in the net, and what rules apply when investigators later search that data. A law written for foreign intelligence can still shape domestic life when family ties, business ties, humanitarian work, and religious networks stretch across borders, as they often do in Muslim communities.